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This project explores the way in which the Nazi Party used the Treaty of 
Versailles, which laid out the Allies’ terms of defeat for Germany after World War 
I, in their propaganda before 1933. The First World War had disastrous effects on 
Germany. The volatile conditions of post-war society created many roadblocks to 
recovery and left millions feeling alienated and disconnected from the newly 
established democratic government. The Treaty of Versailles was incredibly 
unpopular and factored into much anti-government propaganda during the 
interwar years. In my research I analyzed Nazi publications, speeches, and 
member testimony from 1918-1933 and discuss how the Treaty was politicized by 
the Party to fit their agenda. I found that the Nazi Party used the Treaty to build 
their movement by identifying people or groups who had caused Germany’s 
collapse and to justify the purging of those elements. Through the extreme rhetoric 
of violence and conflict the Nazi Party also used the animosity toward the Treaty 
of Versailles to create their own set of cultural values for Germany to rebuild the 





The Treaty of Versailles, signed June 28, 1919, was the peace treaty that 
laid out the conditions of defeat for Germany after the First World War. In 
addition to disarmament, reduced military size, and giving up colonial holdings 
and territory gained during the war, the Treaty stated that Germany must accept 
full responsibility for starting the conflict and needed to pay reparations to the 
Allies for damages.1 Versailles was most vigorously opposed by nationalists, 
conservatives, and the political right, who often referred to it as the Diktat, the 
dictated peace, because it was only accepted under threat of continued hostility by 
the Allies.2 The National Assembly debate of June 22, 1919 regarding whether or 
not to accept the Treaty of Versailles focused not on if terms were fair and just but 
on if Germany had the capability to continue the war with a ruined economy and 
no remaining allies.3 Reception of Versailles was not aided by the fact that it was 
nearly universally rejected by the parties in parliament who voted on it and was 
incredibly unpopular with the German people.4 This near-universal hatred for the 
Treaty of Versailles created a strong foundation for the Nazi Party to use it in their 
propaganda to create and identify enemies of the German state. Demonizing 
Versailles allowed the Nazi Party to exploit and manipulate the emotions of the 
German people during the tumultuous first years of the German Republic and 
 
1 “The Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919”, in The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, ed. Roderick 
Stackelburg and Sally A. Winkle (New York: Routledge, 2002), 57.  
2 Fritz Morstein Marx, Government in the Third Reich (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company 
Inc., 1936), 5. 
3 “The National Assembly Debate on the Treaty of Versailles,” in Inside Hitler’s Germany, ed. 
Benjamin Sax and Dieter Kuntz (Lexington: DC Heath and Company, 1992), 46-47. 




project it onto people or groups implicated in the breakdown of German society 
following the end of the war.    
The Treaty of Versailles further destabilized politics and made it more 
difficult for Germany to establish itself as a democracy after the war. Germany 
made the switch from constitutional monarchy to parliamentary democracy after 
Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated in November 1918, passing power to the largest 
parliamentary party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD). A new constitution was 
drafted and signed in August 1919 in the city of Weimar, cementing Germany as a 
democracy and giving the German Republic the nickname Weimar Germany. To 
its most ardent opponents, the Treaty of Versailles was a national humiliation and 
evidence that Germany’s enemies were subjecting the country to “economic 
enslavement” via enforcing reparations payments.5 For a country that so long 
prided itself on its military strength defeat was unthinkable, and the changes 
German society was undergoing were unacceptable. Conspiracy theories about 
internal sabotage of the military and government abounded. This “stab in back”, 
perpetrated by the “November Criminals” (referencing the Armistice of November 
1918), embodied conservative and nationalist discontent with and rejection of 
democracy in Germany. To them, the Treaty of Versailles marked the foreign 
takeover of Germany and its downfall as a world power.  
 
5 Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic, trans. Richard Deveson (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1993), 122.  
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The National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP), most commonly 
known as the Nazi Party, was founded in February of 1920 and based much of 
their ideology on opposing the changes German society underwent as a result of 
the Treaty of Versailles. A main goal of the Nazi Party was to restore Germany to 
world power status through abolishing the Treaty. The Nazi Party cited Versailles 
as the root of all the crises that struck Germany. The success of Nazism depended 
on conflict and crisis, making the Treaty of Versailles necessary to the Party. They 
would argue that all the economic, political, and social crises facing Germany in 
the Weimar period were its direct consequences. As long as the Treaty was in 
effect, enemies of Germany could always be identified or created, giving the Party 
purpose. Socialists, the political left, Jews, Communists, the Allies, the November 
Criminals; Nazi propaganda tied them all to Versailles and portrayed them all as 
threats to Germany that needed to be purged.    
This project explores how the Nazi Party used the Treaty of Versailles in 
their propaganda from the end of the First World War in 1918 until Hitler’s 
appointment as Chancellor in March of 1933, though focuses primarily on the 
period of 1919 to 1923. It was during these early years of social, economic, and 
political crisis that the Nazi Party was formed and shaped their ideology. The 
purpose of this work is not to establish Versailles as important to Nazism (as that 
is hardly debated) nor is it trying to paint the Treaty as the cause of Third Reich. 
Rather, it is to provide an analysis of the specific way that the Treaty was used in 
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Nazi propaganda. This project also analyzes why Nazi propaganda about sabotage 
and betrayal resonated with certain groups of individuals, such as conservatives, 
nationalists, and veterans, and the circumstances that made them susceptible to the 
violent rhetoric of National Socialism.  
The emergence of Nazism as a major political force in Weimar Germany 
has been extensively studied by scholars since the beginning of the Third Reich in 
1933. Even during the Weimar period scholars were searching to explain how a 
movement like National Socialism formed and rose to prominence in German 
politics. In the 1930s, German historian Fritz Morstein Marx and American 
sociologist Theodore Abel both attributed the rise of Nazism to inflamed 
nationalism. For Marx, it was how the Allies treated Germany as a defeated nation 
through the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, particularly the demilitarization 
clauses, that radicalized sectors of the population.6 Abel, in his 1938 book Why 
Hitler Came Into Power, wrote that Hitler was not “building his movement upon a 
void”, but was rather using and exploiting the existing fear, opposition, and 
discontent in Germany that resulted from the loss of the war and the imposition of 
the Treaty of Versailles.7  
The Sonderweg, or “special path”, thesis became popular for explaining 
Nazism in the World War II and post-war eras. Sonderweg posited that the Third 
 
6 Marx, Government in the Third Reich, 3. 
7 Abel, Why Hitler Came Into Power, 13. 
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Reich was the logical conclusion to all German history, implying that democracy 
was destined to fail in Germany. Scholars asserted that the weaknesses of the 
Weimar system were in part because of the authoritarian nature of German 
political culture. This complicated Germany’s path of modernization in the 
nineteenth century and made democratization impossible. This view is flawed, 
however, because it is based on the idea of there being a correct way for a country 
to modernize, ignoring Germany’s unique sociocultural circumstances or applying 
them incorrectly.8 The trend of looking to Germany’s political past to try to 
explain how a movement like National Socialism could come to be was also 
popular in this era. Rohan Butler in The Roots of National Socialism (1942) and 
Ralph Flenley in Modern German History (1953) start their analysis of German 
society and politics centuries before German unification in 1871. Butler provides 
an in depth analysis on the quality of German national thought starting in the 
eighteenth century, and comes to the conclusion that Germany’s authoritarian 
political history meant that a democratic state was destined to fail.9 Flenley takes a 
more middle ground position by saying that while the Third Reich itself was not 
the singular outcome of the collapse of the Weimar Republic a political structure 
akin to Hitler’s dictatorship was its most likely successor because of the 
prevalence of authoritarian thought in German political culture.10 But, as historian 
 
8 Geoff Eley, From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1986), 256. 
9 Rohan Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 1783-1933 (1942; repr., New York: Howard 
Fertig, 1968). 
10 Ralph Flenley, Modern German History (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1953). 
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Geoff Eley later points out in Unification to Nazism (1986), this approach risks 
taking what eighteenth and nineteenth century German philosophers, politicians, 
and historians thought about government and the role of the state out of their 
appropriate context and twisting them to fit a specific narrative, as well as over-
simplifying the study of Nazism by attributing it to merely the persistence of old 
political traditions.11  
More recent scholarship has moved away from the idea that the Third Reich 
was inevitable. In the 1980s and into the 1990s authors such as Eberhard Kolb, 
Detlev Peukert, and Eley argued that the Weimar Republic needed to be studied as 
more than just a precursor to the Third Reich. Eley wrote that the Third Reich is 
too often considered the “terminal point” that every political development in 
Germany from unification to the Weimar era led to.12 Germany’s attempts to fulfil 
the terms of the Treaty of Versailles are almost always referred to as having only 
negative outcomes. Peukert refuted this idea in his book The Weimar Republic 
when he argued that the Treaty of Versailles had the potential to actually enhance 
Germany’s position in Europe through cooperation and accommodation with other 
nations, strengthening it in the long term, but it was the psychological barrier of 
losing the war that prevented the German government from effectively utilizing its 
new position.13 Peukert established that there existed a disconnect between the 
 
11 Eley, From Unification to Nazism, 233-34. 
12 Eley, From Unification to Nazism, 232. 
13 Peukert, The Weimar Republic, 45. 
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perception of the effects of the Treaty of Versailles and its real effects. Kolb is of 
the same vein when he said the “highly unpropitious circumstances” of the 
Republic’s birth did not doom its long-term viability.14  
The primary sources analyzed in this project consist mainly of publications 
from the Nazi Party, including leadership and regular members. Speeches and 
accounts from Adolf Hitler and Party propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels 
indicate how current events were being explained as products of the Treaty of 
Versailles. They also present Nazism as the sole solution to these issues. Within 
these documents it is important to look for who or what is being identified as a 
problem for Germany and why they are being portrayed that way. Accounts and 
memoirs from people who joined the Nazi Party between 1920 and 1933 are also 
used to provide insight for how messages from the Party resonated with people 
and persuaded them to join. Accounts from other important political actors provide 
greater context for how Versailles was seen in the conservative-nationalist camp, 
as well as give a sense of the general political atmosphere of post-war Germany. 
Other documents, like the Treaty of Versailles itself and the National Assembly 
Debate of June 1919 are also of great importance as they set the groundwork for 
the political, economic, and social developments of the entire Weimar era.  
This research project begins with an overview of German politics and 
political culture prior to the First World War to gain an understanding of how 
 
14 Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic, trans. P.S. Falla (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 4. 
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Germany viewed itself as a nation and how that conception was threatened by the 
defeat and the Treaty of Versailles. This is followed by a discussion of the genesis 
of the Nazi Party, the circumstances it was born into, and the way that Versailles 
and the Weimar Republic factored into its propaganda. From there is a discussion 
about German cultural identity and how it was redefined by the crises of the 
Weimar era and the affect this had on German politics leading up to the 1932 
elections when the Nazis gained control of the government.  
The Treaty of Versailles was hated amongst nationalist circles because it 
signified German society coming under foreign influence. The signing of the 
Treaty marked a fundamental shift in German politics because of its international 
origins. Rejection of the foreign in favor of a purely German culture was central to 
how Germany viewed itself as a people, or a Volk, and a political entity. The 
conceptualization of Germany as a Volk has roots in the Enlightenment, when 
German intellectuals and historians were taking ideas about reason, freedom, and 
empiricism to redefine notions of government and the nation state. Eighteenth 
century historian Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) popularized the view of 
German peoples being part of an organic whole, tied together by culture and 
language.15 It was also during this period that the Volk took on racial and ethnic 
connotations, as a Volk was strongest when it was pure. 
 
15 Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 25. 
12 
 
Volk thought greatly informed German politics, starting in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Influential philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-
1814) believed that the primary goal of the governing body of a nation was to 
create an environment that best supported the advancement and well-being of its 
people.16 For Germany this meant achieving autarky and practicing a purely 
German culture.17 Philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) 
built on this idea when he envisioned the state as the embodiment of the culture of 
the people comprising it.18 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) believed, 
similar to Schelling, that the state was the spirit of the Volk.19 It was therefore 
above judgement by any recognized standard of morality.20 Nazi ideology was 
influenced by Hegel in that the Nazis did not believe in universal ethics. Every 
national community evolved its own set of moral standards and could not be 
judged based on another’s.21 Part of the reason the Treaty of Versailles was 
rejected was because it was a set of rules another country made for Germany to 
follow. 
The idea of creating and preserving a pure German culture also helped 
militarize conceptions of the Volk in the nineteenth century. In 1813, French 
forces under Napoleon invaded Germany. It became critical for Germany’s 
 
16 Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 38. 
17 Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 38. 
18 Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 62-63. 
19 Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 75. 
20 Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 77. 
21 Thomas Kühne, Belonging and Genocide: Hitler’s Community, 1918-1945 (New York: Yale 
University Press, 2010), 5.  
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survival to have a strong military to repel attacks and prevent being absorbed into 
another culture’s body politic. Unity of ideology was also stressed as important for 
military strength; the people needed to truly believe in what they were fighting for. 
Aggression towards the foreign was prominent in Volk thought, though not 
universal.22 Another aspect of Volk militarism was the acquisition of resources to 
ensure Germany’s survival for generations to come. Political theorist Adam 
Heinrich Müller (1779-1829) was one of the earliest thinkers to assert that war 
was necessary for the natural growth of the nation and should thus be met with 
enthusiasm.23 Later historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896) took Müller’s 
ideas to an extreme when he said, “war must be conceived as an institution 
ordained by God.”24 It was Germany’s divine purpose as a Volk to expand across 
the world using war as the instrument to do so. In this way the Volk transformed 
from a political philosophy into a cultural mindset.  
 Unity of ideology became even more important to German leadership after 
unification in 1871 and the establishment of the German Empire. Germany as a 
Volk was used in state propaganda to inspire the people of the different German 
states to see themselves as part of a single entity. It also stressed loyalty to the 
state and conformity to a set of values outlined in official propaganda. There was 
no place for division and difference if the new German Empire were to succeed. 
 
22 George Mosse, Germans and Jews: The Right, the Left, and the Search for a “Third Force” in 
Pre-Nazi Germany (New York: Howard and Fertig, 1970), 14. 
23 Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 72.  
24 Quoted in Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 148. 
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Geoff Eley called this approach “unification from above.”25 This drive for unity 
greatly discouraged party politics. Opponents of parliamentarianism said that party 
politics only encouraged division and distracted people from working towards a 
common good.26 Party politics were unnecessary for, or even actively damaging 
to, the strength and advancement of the nation.  
  The political structure of the German Empire was a constitutional 
monarchy, but democratic practice was weak. Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), the 
German statesman who masterminded German unification, was appointed 
Chancellor by the emperor and headed the federal government until 1890. 
Bismarck’s government was strongly centralized around his office as Chancellor. 
He viewed the party system of the Reichstag (the German parliament) as a marker 
of public opinion, but not something he considered himself nor the government 
obligated to follow.27 He viewed political parties as irresponsible, calling them the 
“ruin of our constitution and our future.”28 It is easy to see how Volk political 
tradition dominated this era. Even the progressive camp was not free from its 
influence. Many liberals in the Bismarckian era accepted the centralized 
monarchical-military control because they believed it would bring unity, however, 
this inhibited the ability of the progressive movement to make significant gains 
over conservatism.29 Volk political thought held that the few would act for the 
 
25 Eley, From Unification to Nazism, 72. 
26 Marx, Government in the Third Reich, 33. 
27 Marx, Government in the Third Reich, 28.  
28 Quoted in Flenley, Modern German History, 289. 
29 Flenley, Modern German History, 280. 
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good of the many as long as the many trusted and remained loyal to the few. In 
this context, parliamentarism only bred unnecessary division and questioned the 
validity of the entire German political system.  
 Volk ideology created unique interpretations of how democracy should 
operate in Germany. In The Roots of National Socialism, Rohan Butler uses the 
example of Weimar foreign minister Walther Rathenau to illustrate how Volk 
ideology colored the perception of the viability of republicanism in Germany.30 
During the First World War Rathenau oversaw Germany’s economy and was a 
minister of reconstruction after the defeat. He was part of the left-leaning German 
Democratic Party (DDP), a party that supported democracy and liberal reform but 
had not voted yes on accepting the Treaty of Versailles.31 In what seems rather 
paradoxical, Rathenau felt that a hybrid of democracy and autocracy was the best 
fit for German government; a ruling elite would represent the interests of society, 
but ultimately all power would be held by one individual.32 Rathenau’s views of 
democracy were not universal in the leftist camp but they do demonstrate how 
German political thinkers were changing democracy to fit German culture rather 
than changing German culture to fit democracy, and how there was still a place for 
authoritarianism in liberal thinking. 
 
30 Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 228-232. 
31 “The National Assembly Debate on the Treaty of Versailles”, 47. 
32 Butler, The Roots of National Socialism, 231. 
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The monocratic structure of German government did not disappear with the 
monarchy after 1918. The office of President held disproportionate power. 
Presidents could appoint chancellors, ministers, army commanders, and civil 
servants without Reichstag approval.33 Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution 
stipulated that if public safety and order were threatened the Reichstag President 
could enact martial law and “temporarily abrogate, wholly or in part, the 
fundamental principles laid down in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 
153.”34 The referenced articles pertained to civil liberties, such as the right to free 
speech and expression of opinion (118) and the ability to peacefully assemble 
(123).35 The arbitrary power afforded to the President reveal that the writers of the 
constitution were either hesitant or reluctant to establish a truly parliamentary 
system.  
 The existence and persistence of these authoritarian structures complicated 
Germany’s ability to become a democracy after the end of World War I. German 
politics emphasized top-down control. Creating a true democracy meant 
completely reversing prior thought and practice. During the war the military had 
controlled the country, with generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff 
as de facto dictators. The transition from a monarchy to a republic was very abrupt 
and was done more to secure potentially lenient terms of defeat from the Allies 
 
33 Marx, Government in the Third Reich, 53. 
34 “The Constitution of the German Republic,” in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton 
Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendburg (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1994), 48.  
35 “The Constitution of the German Republic,” 49. 
17 
 
than to a commitment to democratizing German politics. The lack of transparency 
with the German public about the country’s performance in the war also ensured 
that much of the population was unprepared for the changes in politics that were to 
come. 
When it became clear that they were losing the war in the fall of 1918 
German leadership began devising ways to mitigate the costs of defeat. They 
placed their hopes on appealing to the United States for securing more favorable 
peace terms. In January of 1918 President Woodrow Wilson gave his Fourteen 
Points speech outlining his vision for ending the war and preventing similar 
conflict in the future. Because Wilson detested the authoritarianism and militarism 
of the German Empire, Hindenburg and Ludendorff believed that America would 
be more likely to intervene on Germany’s behalf during peace negotiations if 
Germany adopted a more democratic system of government.36 In October of 1918 
Kaiser Wilhelm II agreed to introduce democratic reform to German politics. The 
Reichstag Chancellor was made responsible only to parliament instead of the 
emperor, and at Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s insistence the civilian parties of the 
Reichstag conducted negotiations with the Allies in place of the imperial 
apparatus.37  
 
36 Catherine Epstein, Nazi Germany: Confronting the Myths (Chicester: John Wiley & Son, Ltd., 
2015), 10.  
37 Epstein, Nazi Germany, 10.  
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 As peace negotiations went on, pressure mounted from both progressive 
and conservative camps for the government to make even more radical political 
changes to placate the Allies. Working class, middle class, and petty bourgeoisie 
alike were calling for more radical constitutional reforms.38 Among the demands 
for political change was Wilhelm’s abdication. It was believed that abdication was 
the only possible option for securing American support after President Wilson 
declared that the United States demanded German surrender if it were to enter 
peace talks with an authoritarian monarchy.39 In October of 1918, Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing said that “The Government of the United States cannot deal 
with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been 
assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany.”40 
Wilhelm’s advisors convinced him to step down as emperor on November 9, 1918 
and Germany signed the Armistice of November 11 as a parliamentary democracy.  
Peace negotiations between the Allies and Germany after 1918 were long 
and messy, ending with the bitter reality of the Treaty of Versailles. With its 
economy and army in ruins, Germany did not have the leverage to tilt negotiations 
in its favor by way of threats.41 In the words of Kolb, “the disputes and conflicts at 
the peace conference took place not between the Allies and their defeated enemies 
 
38 Kolb, The Weimar Republic, 6. 
39 Kolb, The Weimar Republic, 6.  
40 United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1918, Supplement 1, The World War, Volume 1, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp01v01/d327.   
41 Kolb, The Weimar Republic, 23.  
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but within the Allied camp itself.”42 The Germans were also incensed that the 
terms of defeat were not being drafted based on President Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points. But Germany had misconstrued Wilson’s call for their surrender the 
previous October. Wilson’s demand to only negotiate with “veritable 
representatives of the German people” did not necessitate the abolition of the 
monarchy, only that parliament be given more power. Constitutional reform was 
already being advocated for before November. The German imperial government 
had taken matters to the extreme when they did not have to.   
The new government of Germany, headed by the Social Democrats, earned 
itself the name the November Criminals with the signing of the Armistice. The 
expectation among Germans was that the abolition of the monarchy would be 
enough for the Allies to give Germany more lenient conditions of defeat. The 
drive for abolishing the monarchy had been led by the liberal camp and the Social 
Democratic Party. For the SPD to advocate for such radical changes to the 
government – changes that worked in their favor – without getting the promised 
pay off was seen as nothing short of treason to their political opposition. The 
SPD’s reputation was not aided by the fact that on the night of November 8, 1918, 
they had offered the monarchy an ultimatum: either the Kaiser abdicates, and SPD 
influence is strengthened, or the party withdraws from the government.43 The SPD 
 
42 Kolb, The Weimar Republic, 23. 




was the largest political party in Germany at this time. Their withdrawal from 
politics would have had dire consequences for political and social stability. In 
subsequent years, the November Criminals were vilified by the Nazi Party for 
acting in their own interests rather than for the good of the country. Not only had 
they sabotaged the war effort, but they violated Volk principles of the state being 
the guardian of the people. Bismarck’s belief of party politics ruining the country 
seemed to hold true. Many conservatives and nationalists vehemently opposed 
democracy because of its close association with losing the war, delegitimizing the 
Weimar Republic before it even truly began.   
The Social Democratic Party was unequipped to handle real authority when 
they were passed power in 1918. Part of this is because of Germany’s authoritarian 
political traditions. As discussed above, the Reichstag had very little real power 
prior to 1914 because of how the imperial government viewed parliamentarism. 
Furthermore, the SPD failed to take advantage of their newfound power to make 
the revolutionary changes they promised. Even before the First World War their 
commitment to revolutionary values was debated. In 1900, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Imperial Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow described the Social 
Democratic Party as being a “reforming party” rather than a revolutionary one.44 
Their desire for majority support made them take a gradual implementation 
 
44 Flenley, Modern German History, 304.  
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approach rather than enacting sweeping change all at once.45 In his book The Nazi 
Seizure of Power, historian William Sheridan Allen said the SPD “was unwilling 
to be a revolutionary party at a time when the best defense of democracy may have 
been social revolution.”46 The SPD chose to work within the existing power 
framework rather than create a new one that was more conducive for what they 
wanted to achieve. In some ways this is understandable because they were keen to 
avoid alienating more of the population. Unity was a priority, prompting the SPD 
to make the hard choice of compromising its revolutionary goals to garner support 
from the center and the right. Unfortunately, it was precisely this unwillingness to 
take a hard stance and risk alienating voters that gained the socialist government 
the reputation of being weak, ineffective, and harmful to the wellbeing of the 
nation.    
The failure of the Social Democrats to unite German politics and their 
inability to alleviate the effects of social and economic crisis created fertile a 
breeding ground for radical fringe groups to form and grow. The Nazi Party was 
merely one such group. The atmosphere of high unemployment, food scarcity, and 
attacks on cultural identity between 1919 and 1923 politicized the population and 
drove many into forming or joining radical antidemocratic groups. It was during 
this time that a young Adolf Hitler joined what would become the Nazi Party. But 
 
45 Calvin Hoover, Germany Enters the Third Reich (London: MacMillan and Co. Limited, 1933), 
35. 
46 William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 
1922-1945, revised ed. (Danbury: Franklin Watts, 1984), 54.  
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the plethora of radical right-wing parties that emerged in this period were hardly 
united. They were disorganized and often contradicted each other in their 
ideology, inhibiting them from forming a strong front of opposition to the socialist 
government.47 This also kept them from threatening the political power of already 
established right-wing parties, such as the German National People’s Party 
(DNVP), the major conservative-nationalist party in Weimar. It was not until the 
Nazi Party (and even then not until the late 1920s) that the radical right fringe 
consolidated and took over the traditional conservative-nationalist position.  
 The Nazi reaction to the Treaty of Versailles was informed by the Volk 
ideology of rejecting and purging foreign elements that weakened Germany as a 
people and a nation. The Nazi Party was originally founded as the German 
Worker’s Party (DAP) on January 5, 1919. That same day, party founder Anton 
Drexler published a set of guidelines for the DAP in the newspaper Auf gut 
Deutsch (In Good German), an antisemitic weekly run by party cofounder Dietrich 
Eckart. One guideline reads, “We want to be governed only by Germans; 
foreigners and Jews govern us only in their own interest or in the interest of a 
foreign country.”48 Nationalists and conservatives hated the Treaty of Versailles 
before its terms were even finalized because of what it represented: Germany 
being conquered by a stronger entity. In Volk philosophy this almost certainly 
 
47 Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, 25.  




meant death as a weak Volk was easily conquered, and a Volk that had been 
conquered meant it had been weak. It also revealed the anxiety over the extent of 
foreign influence that the DAP and the larger radical nationalist faction expected 
peace negotiations would bring. The un-Germanness of the parliamentary system 
and hatred of internationalism featured heavily in later Nazi anti-Weimar 
propaganda.  
The Party Program of 1920 is very telling of Nazi attitudes towards the 
changes the Treaty of Versailles brought to Germany. The program was presented 
at the Party’s first public meeting on February 24, 1920. Adolf Hitler drafted the 
program alongside Gottfried Feder and Anton Drexler. Its twenty-five points 
establish the basis of Nazi ideology and their goals and demands. The Treaty of 
Versailles is referred to explicitly very early on; the second point reads, “we 
demand equality of rights for the German people in its dealings with other nations, 
and the abolishment of the Peace Treaties of Versailles.”49 The first point calls for 
the unification of all Germans into a Greater Germany on “the basis of the right of 
self-determination.”50 The Nazi Party immediately established itself as standing in 
direct opposition to Versailles. They portrayed it as the instrument the Allies were 
using to impose their own will on Germany and to deny them the dignity and 
respect afforded to other nations.  
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The stab-in-the-back legend circulated by right-wing nationalists also 
contributed to the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. Official propaganda about 
the success of the German war effort had done its job as most on the home front 
were unaware Germany was even struggling until the Armistice was announced.51 
It was unthinkable that Germany’s strong military could have suffered so complete 
a defeat as in 1918. Prominent military men and politicians advanced the idea that 
internal sabotage made Germany lose. General Hindenburg, in his testimony 
before the Constitutional Assembly in November 1919, said that Germany’s defeat 
was the result of “secret intentional mutilation of the fleet and the army” by 
revolutionary forces.52 Revolutionary forces meaning the political left. For those 
who believed it, the political left and any entities associated with it (most often the 
Jews) came to represent the downfall of Germany and the continued negative 
impact of foreign institutions. The stab-in-the-back legend was a crucial element 
in Nazi militarism because it justified aggression against those who would see 
Germany fail.53 By identifying them as enemies, violence against perpetrators of 
Weimar was encouraged as necessary. 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s propagation of the stab-in-the-back myth 
gave it legitimacy. Hindenburg was a well-known political figure and a war hero 
and Ludendorff had been leader of the Supreme Army Command. That two 
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military leaders such as these would believe that Germany had been sabotaged 
must be true. Yet it was these two generals who had masterminded the German 
surrender in 1918. The SPD and the political left were only criminals and traitors 
because military leadership had failed to win the war. Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff’s success in passing control of the country to the Reichstag parties 
absolved the old leadership of facing the consequences of its own failed policy.54 
In this way the reputation of the political right was not seriously damaged by the 
events of 1918 and 1919.55 The left had a harder time gaining new supporters from 
the conservatives and nationalists because of this. The stab-in-the-back also made 
out the new political right, represented by groups like the Nazis, as a valid 
alternative to current politics because these groups advocated for and engaged in 
violence against the government in order to right the injustices the November 
Criminals had committed against the German military and the German people.  
Reparations payments were one such injustice forced upon Germany and 
were an especially contentious part of the Treaty of Versailles. In his address to 
the National Assembly in February of 1919, while peace negotiations were still 
ongoing, German President and SPD leader Friedrich Ebert strongly objected to 
reparations and encouraged the Assembly to contest them. Like many of his peers, 
he considered the demand for reparations to be nothing more than the Allies trying 
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to exact revenge on Germany by resigning them to debt slavery; “the German 
people cannot for 20, 40, or 60 years be made the wage slave of other nations.”56 
The effect of reparations on Germany’s economy and its consequences for the 
good of the people factored prominently in Nazi propaganda in the 1920s. In one 
of his speeches, prominent Nazi orator, speech writer, and future propaganda 
minister Joseph Goebbels said that the Allies had essentially reduced Germany to 
the status of colony, being used only to “fill money sacks with interest 
payments.”57 The Volk fear of being conquered by another, stronger nation had 
apparently been realized and it was the current leaders of the country who had 
enabled it to happen. The could be no more clearer evidence than this that 
allowing the democratic government to continue running the country would only 
result in more ruin.  
At the National Assembly debate of June 22, 1919, the only parties that 
voted to accept the Treaty were the Social Democrats, the Independent Social 
Democrats (USDP),58 and the Catholic Center Party.59 But the reasons for the SPD 
and Center yes vote were not because they believed Versailles to be a fair 
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agreement. Rather, they believed that the Treaty was a means of preventing future 
destruction. The SPD believed that voting no to a peace agreement only delayed a 
yes vote because Germany did not have the means to resist at that time.60 There 
were still clauses that these parties opposed, such as accepting full blame for the 
war and paying reparations. But admitting the Treaty of Versailles “exceed[ed] the 
limits of Germany’s ability to comply”61 and still voting yes hardly endeared the 
SPD to non-supporters and did little to dispel the myth of the party’s betrayal.  
Using the stab-in-the-back legend, the Nazi Party placed the Weimar 
Republic and its democratic values in direct opposition to true German values. In 
the early days of the Party Hitler often cited the Social Democrats and their allies, 
sometimes even the entire parliamentary system, as responsible for the breakdown 
of German political life. In a speech given in Munich in December 1922, Hitler 
contrasts the failings of the current system with the strength of the old Empire. 
The SPD were swindlers, liars, “the dumbest people and those most useless to 
their professions” who acted in the interest of the Allies instead of the German 
nation, and whose successes were “attributable only to a propaganda of lies.”62 
Hitler presented the National Socialists as being the only dependable party 
because they espoused the same values of greatness and victory that the old 
Empire did.63 In contrast, the November Criminals had betrayed the country and 
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drove it to ruin to advance their own agenda. A key element of anti-Versailles 
Nazi political propaganda was that Nazism was the only solution to the issues 
created by Versailles.   
The clauses of the Treaty regarding Germany’s military help explain why 
veterans made up a large portion of Nazi support. The Allies had enforced German 
disarmament without disarming themselves, putting Germany in a position where 
it was surrounded by armed enemies with no military power of its own.64 At the 
signing of the Armistice the German military numbered six million.65 Versailles 
reduced this to only one hundred thousand and set strict limits on the size of the 
navy and completely abolished the air force.66 By severely reducing the size of the 
military the Allies had directly attacked a cornerstone of German nationalism. The 
military as an institution was the nation’s first line of defense against hostile 
outsiders. Removing this left the country unprotected and vulnerable to further 
assault.   
The loss of World War I and the imposition of the Treaty of Versailles was 
a great humiliation to Germany, and ex-soldiers felt this very keenly. In more 
ways than one many veterans found returning to civilian life difficult. “The march 
home was the bitterest experience I have ever had,” writes one ex-soldier, “I was a 
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broken man, on the point of losing himself…”67 The chance of a military career 
for veterans was reduced to almost nothing given the restrictions outlined in the 
Treaty. Jobs were scarce due to the damage the war wrought on the economy. 
Many veterans felt that the promises of liberty, peace, and democracy made by the 
socialist government did not apply to them.68 They were left confused and 
disoriented in a new, alien society. One soldier wrote, “we could not be reconciled 
to the apparent fact that all our struggles and sacrifices had been in vain.”69 The 
slow return of German prisoners of war did not aid in the demilitarization of a 
significant portion of men. In 1919 there were still over eight hundred thousand 
German prisoners of war being held by Allied forces, and many would not be 
home until mid-1920.70 Available jobs were taken by that point, leaving many 
unemployed, desperate, and resentful. Many men joined the Nazi Stormtroopers 
(Sturmabteilung, SA) for the simple reason that it fed and clothed its members in 
times when work was scarce or irregular.71 In this way the NSDAP succeeded 
where the government did not in providing for the German people, and the Party 
used this to its advantage to discredit the so-called socialist values of the Weimar 
government.  
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As a proxy for the real military, many former military men joined 
paramilitary organizations like the Freikorps. The private units, or citizen militias, 
that made up the Freikorps were often hired by national-conservative political 
groups to put down left-wing movements or uprisings, sometimes working 
alongside what was left of the formal German military, the Reichswehr.72 The 
drive of the Freikorps was to protect Germany from internal and external threats.73 
The Freikorps was decidedly antidemocratic, anticommunist, and was willing to 
act outside the law. At their peak in 1919 the organization had over two hundred 
thousand members, most of them veterans.74 Robert Herzstein wrote that the 
Freikorps “was an outlet for frustrated militaristic and patriotic sentiments.”75 One 
young man who joined the Freikorps soon after the war detailed the feeling of 
hopelessness and betrayal he felt watching crowds cheering for the soldiers 
returning from the front, “Could the casualties of war have been for nothing? That 
could not be the case; that was impossible.”76 For the true patriot, defeat was an 
unacceptable reality. As for why he joined the Freikorps he said, “what we wanted 
we did not know, and what we knew we did not want. War, adventure, excitement, 
and destruction; an indefinable, tormenting force…”77 Joining militaristic 
organizations gave these men order and purpose when they felt there was none. 
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Many who joined the Nazi SA after its founding in 1921 were former Freikorps 
members. 
Between 1921 and 1922 the Freikorps were behind a series of 
assassinations of Republican leaders, which were applauded by Germany’s 
political right.78 Their victims included Matthias Erzberger, the Center politician 
who had signed the Armistice, and Walther Rathenau, the Republic’s Foreign 
Minister and the man who had been in charge of organizing Germany’s economy 
during World War I. Erzberger and Rathenau were among the November 
Criminals, so their deaths were justified as the elimination of an enemy of 
Germany. Eliminating those implicated in Germany’s downfall during World War 
I was the necessary first step to restoring Germany as world power.  
Hitler’s status as veteran gave him considerable influence with the unsettled 
ex-military population. He had served in the German army from 1914 to 1919 and 
understood the bitter feelings of the soldiers well. One veteran-turned-Nazi said of 
Hitler; “You are our man. You speak as a soldier of the front and as a man…you 
have given your whole being…for the wellbeing of Germany.”79 His anti-
Versailles militarism drew in those who felt the terms of the Versailles Treaty 
were driven by the Allies’ fears of a strong Germany. To the disaffected patriot, 
Hitler represented the true German man, the strong soldier willing to sacrifice 
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everything for his nation. He also offered strong leadership and inspired hope and 
confidence in Germany’s future, two qualities that many felt Weimar was 
seriously lacking.80 The Nazi Party was also supported by what was left of the 
Reichswehr. The German army was well known to assist radical right-wing groups 
to subvert the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding military activity.81 
Much of the funding in the NSDAP’s early days came from the Reichswehr.82 In 
fact, it was Reichswehr officials who ordered Hitler to attend a DAP meeting in 
September of 1919.83 The official military gave these groups legitimacy through 
its patronage, helping to swell their numbers. Through contact with the Nazi Party, 
many young veterans were introduced to politics “in the familiar terms of 
discipline and fighting.”84 The Weimar Republic was subsequently turned into the 
antithesis to everything these men held to be true about their people and country.  
There was no shortage of anger over the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles 
for the Nazi Party to exploit. Along with reparations, the infamous war guilt clause 
caused an uproar. Article 231 required that “Germany accepts the responsibility of 
Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied 
and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjects.”85 Germany 
felt itself surrounded by enemies who hated it and wished to see it fall. “We know 
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the intensity of the hatred which meets us,” said Foreign Minister Ulrich von 
Brockdorf-Rantzau at the Versailles Peace Conference in Paris in May of 1919.86 
Placing full blame for the destruction on Germany was both egregiously unfair and 
well beyond the nation’s economic capability to cover. Theologian Ernst Troeltsch 
called Versailles “an imperialist monstrosity made possibly by the deceit of the 
Fourteen Points,”87 putting into words the popular sentiment that the War Guilt 
clause and the Treaty of Versailles as a whole were less about peace and 
reconciliation between equals and more the Allies trying to annihilate a threat to 
enhance their own power.    
The Nazi Party used the Treaty of Versailles to create friend-foe 
dichotomies. Everything was presented as opposites: National Socialism or 
Marxism, German or Jew, national or foreign, strength or weakness, survival or 
annihilation. In Nazi thought, as it was in Volk thought, internationalism was the 
breakdown of German strength. Germany’s restoration could only come about if 
Germans focused on helping other Germans. By using fears of social breakdown, 
the Nazi Party appealed more to emotion than to reason. Hitler believed that 
appealing to emotion was the best way to build a movement because it inspired 
stronger belief. In his autobiography Mein Kampf he wrote, “The broad masses of 
a population are more amenable to the appeal of rhetoric than to any other force. 
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All great movements are popular movements. They are the volcanic eruptions of 
human passions and emotions…”88 Weimar Germany had nothing if not eruptions 
of emotions. There existed in Weimar Germany an existential fear for the 
country’s future. It was not difficult for the Nazis to convince people of impending 
doom and get them to support radical action when they may not have otherwise.  
In October 1925, Joseph Goebbels published a tract regarding the state of 
Weimar politics and the future of Germany titled “National Socialism or 
Bolshevism?” This piece argues that the international qualities of Weimar 
socialism are ineffective in providing for the needs of the German people.89 
Internationalism was detrimental to the health of the German Volk because it is 
not the German way. Goebbels conceded that Socialist Democrats and National 
Socialists have the same goals for the country – freedom and stability – but argued 
that only National Socialism could achieve them. He writes, “we want freedom, as 
you do, but with other means, with means that lead with to the goal…The 
community of the people today is nothing but the struggle for the rights of the 
people for the sake of the nation.”90 The means and methods of National Socialism 
are rooted in Volk cultural values, making them the best path forward for 
Germany. One such method of attaining freedom for Germany was to protest the 
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German government that had decided not to fight the forces that subjugated the 
country. Goebbels asserted that going the route of peaceful discussion with the 
Allies made a mockery of the suffering the German people experienced after the 
end of the war. “To talk of calm today is to make the cemetery one’s home; to be 
peaceful  under this government is to be pacifist and cowardly.”91 Associating 
peace and pacifism with cowardice is very telling of how Nazism viewed foreign 
relations. Germany was meant to be a strong nation, a world power, and it could 
not be that via peaceful cooperation. This could only be attained through struggle 
against foreign entities and institutions. Goebbels called for unity between 
Germans to overthrow the democratic government in favor of a National Socialist 
one to ensure the survival of the nation.  
Another success of the Nazi Party was that it set itself apart from the 
Weimar political system. National Socialism was much more than a political party 
with an agenda, it was a movement “that encompassed everything Germans held 
to be true and just.”92 Theodore Abel’s 1938 study Why Hitler Came Into Power 
provides insight into why so many people converted to Nazism during the 1920s. 
In 1934, as a sociology professor at Columbia University, Abel convinced the 
Nazi state to let him hold an essay contest for Party members who had joined 
before 1933 by saying that the rest of the world needed to learn more about 
 
91 Goebbels, “National Socialism or Bolshevism?”, 127.  
92 Randall Bytwerk, “The Magical Force of the Spoken Word,” in Landmark Speeches of National 
Socialism (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 10.  
36 
 
National Socialism. In one essay, a bank clerk who joined the Party sometime 
before 1927 said that the belief in National Socialism was not something learned, 
but something that sprang up from instinct.93 Nazism was successful because it put 
into words the feelings many already held about the state of Germany and its 
future. The Treaty of Versailles uprooted deeply entrenched social values and 
produced an emotional reaction from the people.94 This emotion manifested in the 
extreme nationalism the Nazis were known for.  
 The rallying point of National Socialism was the Volksgemeinschaft, or the 
national community. In 1925 Hitler cited the real reason for Germany’s collapse in 
World War I as being the millions of Germans who “no longer believe[d] in their 
ethnicity.”95 A common idea spread among nationalists following 1918 was that 
unity had not been strong enough during the war.96 This is how the stab-in-the-
back was able to happen: the Socialist-Jewish construct of class lines had 
encouraged internal divisions, causing Germans to turn against Germans instead of 
fighting their external enemies. To unify once again and restore the German nation 
to its former strength, the Nazis stressed conformity to a set of values based in the 
Volk. One such value was racial purity. In Belonging and Genocide: Hitler’s 
Community, 1918-1945, historian Thomas Kühne analyzes how advocating for 
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mass murder was used by the Nazi Party as a unifying force. He wrote that 
genocidal war against the Jews and other “undesirables” was more than just a 
purge of potential danger, it was a way for the German people to bond as part of 
the Volkgemeinschaft, “delud[ing] themselves into believing that they would attain 
a homogenous and harmonious social body, cleansed of pollution, conflict, and 
inner enemies.”97 The unification of Germany the National Socialists desired went 
far beyond just politics. They believe that a pure German populace would no doubt 
support Nazism because the Party represented pure German ideals. The political 
divisions and social upheaval that Germany experienced after 1918 were therefore 
not just the result of differences of opinion between groups or individuals, they 
were differences of biology and culture. This absolutist view encouraged violence 
against “others” because those deemed dangerous could not be changed, they had 
to be eradicated for the threat they posed to be neutralized.    
Jews were an important group in Nazi propaganda against the Treaty of 
Versailles and the Weimar government. Jews were lumped in with the November 
Criminals, Socialists, Communists, or any group that was associated with the 
Weimar system and blamed for the outcome of the war. Like the others, the Jews 
were accused of working against the common good by allying with international 
forces to further their own agenda. The purported rootlessness of German Jews – 
that they had moved onto the land instead of organically evolving there – meant 
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that they had no spiritual connection to and love for the land or its true people, and 
therefore had more potential to cause harm.98 In a 1922 speech Hitler charged that 
the Communist and Social Democratic movements were Jewish creations made 
with the intent of destroying German culture.99 Goebbels once wrote in no 
uncertain terms that “the Jew caused our misery and lives from it today.”100 
Appealing to fear was the Nazi’s specialty, and they used this tactic to make 
Germany’s Jews into perhaps the greatest enemy facing the nation.  
Nazi accusations of the Jews of committing treason through sabotaging the 
war effort and working with the Allies to impose the Treaty of Versailles on 
Germany did not create the rabid antisemitism Hitler’s party was known for, 
though it certainly had a hand in its radicalization. Antisemitism was centuries old 
in Germany by the time Hitler was trying rebuild a nation with it. The idea of the 
Volksgemeinschaft formed in the late sixteenth century and with it came the 
concept of “blood and soil” (Sturm und Drang),101 where each “race” of people 
had evolved their own culture in their own land. The Germans were an 
Aryan/Nordic people, the French were Latin, and the Jews were Jewish. These 
were lines that could never be crossed as they were how populations had naturally 
evolved. Therefore, a Jew could never be a German, and vice versa. Nor were the 
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Jews native to the land they lived on; Jewish culture had developed in the Levant, 
not Central Europe. The European Jewish population not being an organic part of 
the places they resided was key to how the Nazi’s weaponized antisemitism.102 
Jews were not of German blood nor of German soil, thus their presence was cause 
for alarm. Gemeinschaft also has connotations of being a genuine or authentic 
community, meaning that Jews or other outsiders could not just assimilate to 
German culture and be accepted.103 If the German nation and people were to be as 
strong as possible, they needed to be rid of foreign elements that drained resources 
and weakened the national community.   
 Germany’s Jews were outsiders to German culture, and it was this view of 
them that the Nazis capitalized on. Antisemitism it was nearly ubiquitous in Volk 
philosophy and pervaded German nationalism. As was common in Volk 
nationalism, the Nazis said that any outside influence was hostile to Germany. 
Nazi caricatures of Jews drew on stereotypes and prejudices that had existed since 
the nineteenth century,104 meaning there was a readily available audience of 
people who either believed already, or were predisposed to believe, negative 
things about Jewish people. The aftermath of World War I left many searching for 
someone or something to pin blame on, especially because of the credence given 
to the stab-in-the-back legend. The Jews were easy scapegoats because they were 
 
102 Mosse, Germans and Jews, 67. 
103 Mosse, Germans and Jews, 91.  
104 Mosse, Germans and Jews, 35. 
40 
 
“others”, a non-German people taking up space on German land and using 
German resources.  
 The desire to rid Germany of enemies came to a head in November of 1923 
when Hitler attempted a coup in Munich to take over the southern state of Bavaria. 
Between 1918 and 1922, Bavaria had become a breeding ground of conservative-
nationalist resistance because it was the only state that had not outlawed a number 
of radical right fringe groups deemed threats by the federal government.105 On the 
night of November 8, in a beer hall that frequently hosted Nazi meetings, Hitler 
attempted to coerce right-wing Bavarian leaders into supporting his plan to 
takeover Berlin. Hitler declared that Bavaria had a new government headed by 
him, with his cabinet including current officials. Upon leaving the beer hall the 
morning of November 9, Hitler and his men were detained by police. Hitler was 
tried for treason and sentenced to five years in prison, but he would only serve 
nine months.  
 The Beer Hall Putsch, as it became known, shows how irreparable the 
divide between the nationalists-conservatives and the political left had become. 
Among Hitler’s entourage in Munich the night of November 8 was General Erich 
Ludendorff. After the war Ludendorff embraced the violent nationalism of the 
radical right. His involvement was significant because, as war hero and former 
military leader, it aligned the goals and ideals of the Nazi Party with those of the 
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German Empire, which the nationalists romanticized as the epitome German 
strength. One such ideal was that the survival of the German nation and people 
could only be ensured by the destruction of the forces that would do it harm. Just 
one year prior to the Putsch, Ludendorff said that the German people should begin 
preparing themselves for war with the Allies once again because it the only way 
Germany’s suffering could be alleviated. For Ludendorff and other Volk 
nationalists, war 
is the foundation for comprehending anything political, the foundation of 
our future, even and especially for the enslaved Nation of the Germans. Its 
premise is that [Germany] wants to win back its autonomy, its freedom, its 
welfare, and its developmental possibilities; and it resists our enemies’ 
intention to have us resign ourselves in perpetuity to degradation, to let 
ourselves be stricken from the stage of world history.106 
For Hitler, Ludendorff, and those who followed them, the Weimar system could 
not be saved. The only solution to the economic, social, and political crises 
Germany experienced was the complete annihilation of Weimar, the people who 
brought it on and perpetuated it, and everything it represented.  
The Putsch was also in part a response to two critical events of 1923: the 
French occupation of the Ruhr industrial region near the French-German border 
and the hyperinflation crisis. Both were labelled as consequences of fulfilling the 
terms of the Treaty. Germany was in the midst of economic collapse when Hitler 
was holding Bavarian officials hostage in a beer hall. From the Republic’s very 
 




beginning Germany struggled to keep up with reparations payments. The 
reparations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were drafted with Germany’s ruined 
economy in mind yet made not concessions. Article 232 recognized that 
Germany’s ability to pay was insufficient at the time of drafting but made full 
compensation a requirement regardless.107 This is where the idea of debt slavery 
emerged. Given the state of Germany’s economy in 1918 and immediately after it 
was clear that Germany would be making payments decades into the future. On 
January 9, 1923, French forces occupied the Ruhr region on the pretext that 
Germany was behind on reparations payments.108 Starting in the summer of that 
year, inflation started to escalate dramatically. Inflation was not new to the people 
of Weimar Germany, as prices had risen significantly between 1919 and 1921 
following demobilization.109 But the rate of inflation accelerated in 1922 because 
the government was funding itself by printing new money.110 This continued 
through 1923 and by the end of November the German Reichmark was valued at 
one four-trillionth the US dollar, resulting in the wholesale collapse of German 
currency.  
 Hitler justified the Putsch by saying it was done to save the German nation 
from destruction. The events of 1923 certainly made the German people feel as 
though the country were about to crumble. He directly mentions French 
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occupation of the Ruhr as one of his reasons, as well as the desire to free the 
German people from “slavery.”111 At his trial in 1924 he said, “Either Marxism 
poisons the people, their Germany is ruined or the poison is going to be eliminated 
– Then Germany can recover again, not before that.”112 Compromise was not an 
option. Germany could only return to its place in the sun through war: “World 
politics are not made with the palm branch, but with the sword.”113 German 
suffering could only end if National Socialism took over, because they alone 
recognized the true source of that suffering and were the only force willing to act.  
 The Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler’s trial, and his short imprisonment forced the 
Nazi Party to rethink its political tactics for achieving its goals. Another failed 
takeover could spell the end of the movement. 1928 marked the first time the 
NSDAP participated in national parliamentary elections. Though participating in 
the hated democratic system was contrary to all Nazi beliefs, Goebbels makes it 
clear that this step did not mean the Party was compromising its values. It was 
only to ensure that the National Socialist will was heard. In an article published in 
April of 1928 in the Nazi newspaper Der Angriff (The Assault) Goebbels wrote, 
“We will step foot on the marble floor of parliament with hard strides, and will 
bring with us the revolutionary will of the multitude from which destiny has 
spawned us. We don’t give a damn about cooperating with a stinking dung heap. 
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We are coming to clear the manure.”114 The new tactic for taking over the country 
was to infiltrate the government and dismantle it from the inside.  
 Blaming the Treaty of Versailles and the November Criminals continued to 
be a critical point of Nazi propaganda during the Depression. Tensions were high 
as unemployment and food scarcity skyrocketed starting in 1930. After the 
hyperinflation of 1923 Germany had used short-term American loans to pay 
reparations to France and Britain. When the American stock market crashed in 
October of 1929 Germany was unable to pay back the money when the credits 
were called in. After 1930, disagreements between parties about how best to 
handle the economic crisis made a stable parliamentary majority coalition 
unattainable, leaving Reichstag Chancellor Heinrich Brüning with no choice but to 
use emergency powers to pass laws.115 How to handle the Depression was proving 
beyond the capabilities of the Reichstag, and the situation only further deteriorated 
as time went on. By the start of 1933 one in three people were unemployed.116 A 
few weeks before the first of the 1932 elections, Joseph Goebbels gave a speech in 
Berlin railing against those in power who ruined the country.117 In true Nazi 
fashion he appealed to emotion to exploit the fear and desperation that pervaded 
Germany during the Depression. He said, “the nation’s whole fortune is 
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squandered, people are robbed of their inheritance, people are desperate and 
without hope.”118 The choice of voting National Socialist or Social Democrat was 
presented as being literally the difference between Germany’s life and death. 
Goebbels makes several references to specific consequences of Versailles as well. 
The territory given to Poland after the war so it could have sea access is referred to 
as a “bleeding wound” that divided the country because it cut off the state of 
Prussia in the east from the rest of Germany.119 The Dawes Plan of 1924 and the 
Young Plan of 1930, both readjustments to Germany’s reparations plan in the 
aftermath of economic crisis, brought only “more hunger, more torture, more 
terror, more horror, and more suffering” to Germany.120 Using the same messages 
and themes of social breakdown between 1929 and 1932 as between 1919 and 
1923 allowed the Nazis to say that not only had Germany’s situation not improved 
after fourteen years of Social Democratic control, it had gotten infinitely worse. 
Germany’s experiment in democracy ended in March 1933 when Hitler was 
appointed Reichstag Chancellor after the National Socialists secured a majority of 
the vote in the 1932 election.  
 The Treaty of Versailles did not create the Third Reich, but it was 
instrumental in the Nazi rise to power. The Treaty was important to the Nazi Party 
because through it they were able to convince millions that Germany faced an 
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existential threat and the choice between National Socialist and any other political 
creed was a matter of life or death. By doing this National Socialism portrayed 
itself as the only force that recognized these threats and the only one willing and 
capable to eliminate them. Depictions of Versailles remained much the same 
between 1919-1933; it was the cause of all German suffering. The Treaty was so 
hated in Germany that it being blamed for any and every crisis was believable, 
even if said crises was not caused by, or could not be explicitly tied to, fulfillment 
of treaty conditions. The overarching message the Nazi Party pushed during the 
Weimar era that was so successful was that accepting defeat and following the 
Allies terms guaranteed Germany’s eventual annihilation. The very existence of 
the German people was at stake because of the Treaty of Versailles, and that 
necessitated radical and decisive action. 
The rhetoric of Weimar-era Nazi propaganda regarding the Treaty of 
Versailles  underscores the existential fear that pervaded Germany after 1918. At 
the beginning of the First World War the country seemed to be united as it never 
had been before. The sudden announcement that Germany would surrender to the 
Allies left millions of Germans in shock, wondering how such a thing could have 
happened. Veterans were especially susceptible to Nazi rhetoric of  sabotage and 
betrayal because they were reminded that they had failed to protect their country. 
The fundamental shift in German politics – from monarchy to democracy – came 
so suddenly there was no way to prepare for it. Germany continuing the war as 
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long as it had decimated the economy and with the added burden of reparations 
payments guaranteed recovery would be slow and laborious and that the German 
people would be feeling the negative effects long into the future.  
This profound sense of fear and confusion manifested as anger and 
hopelessness. The weak, fractured society of Germany after 1918 was a complete 
reversal from the military world power it had been in 1914. Everyone wanted 
answers, to have any way to rationalize what had happened. Losing World War I 
and being subjected to the Treaty of Versailles challenged deeply entrenched 
cultural ideals rooted in the Volk and shook the foundations of German cultural 
identity. Millions of Germans were forced to reassess their place in the world on 
both a national and individual scale.  
Hitler and the Nazi Party exploited and harnessed the anger and uncertainty 
over Germany’s future after the end of the war. The Party also created channels 
for these frustrations to be released through by identifying certain people or groups 
of people as being the reason why Germany failed. The Socialist government was 
of course targeted because of its role in peace negotiations in 1918 and 1919 and 
because of its inability to fix the crises that struck Germany afterward. The Jews 
were also targeted because their status as outsider to German culture made them a 
threat according to Volk philosophy. The November Criminals compromised a 
mix of Socialist, Communist, leftist, and Jewish elements that in some way or 
another supposedly had a hand in Germany’s downfall. The conspiracy theories 
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the Nazi Party had about their opponents and their hand in making the Treaty of 
Versailles created for Nazi supporters tangible goals and a sense of purpose in a 
period defined by uncertainty and insecurity.   
Studying the character of anti-Versailles Nazi Party propaganda raises 
interesting questions about German identity and the quality of German nationalism 
in the early twentieth century. The calamitous events of 1918-1933 upset 
previously held notions of what it meant to be German and prompted, if not 
necessitated, their redefinition. This attack on German national identity combined 
with the existential fear that defined the Weimar era created a deadly brand of 
reactionary nationalism, headed by the National Socialists, that sought to purge 
every element that had upset those convictions and threatened the spirit of the 
German Volk. Violence and mass murder against any and all foreign entities 
became the only tools effective enough to restore the German nation to glory and 
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